Environmental Policy Formation and the Tax Treatment of Citizen Interest Groups

With increasing technological advancements more sophisticated mobile devices are being used by end-users. Third generation (3G) mobile communication systems such as Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS) are not able to satisfy the rising demand for higher throughputs and low latencies. New standards based on Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM), such as Long Term Evolution (LTE) and Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX), have been proposed and are currently being integrated into existing mobile networks all over the world. LTE specifications are being finalized within the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) with the ambitious goals of increased spectral efficiency and end user throughput. Despite the introduction of several high data rate services, voice communication is still an essential part of the overall wireless wide area cellular communication market. In LTE, the core network is purely packet switched, thus voice is transmitted entirely using a Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP). Like its predecessor standards it is desired that a large number of simultaneous VoIP calls be supported in LTE, while satisfying the desired Quality of Service (QoS) demands. This thesis examines issues related to VoIP capacity for LTE. One of the key challenges is the limited number of schedulable voice packets per sub frame. The main goal of this thesis is to quantify the impact of this limitation. After describing basic LTE concepts, a detailed description of the control channel resource limitations for the scheduling of voice packets is presented. Consequences of these limitations are explained systematically by presenting the problem in a wider context. Simulation results were obtained using the openWNS Simulator, an event driven system level simulation platform developed at the Communication Networks Research Group (ComNets), RWTH Aachen University Germany. Results are presented showing the impact of different scheduling strategies on VoIP capacity. These results illustrate how the limited control channel resources, specifically the Physical Downlink Control Channel (PDCCH) resources, affect the total number of schedulable VoIP user audio media streams.Med ökande tekniska framsteg mer avancerade mobila enheter som används av slutanv ändarna. Tredje generationens (3G) mobila kommunikationssystem såsom Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS) inte kan tillgodose den ökande efterfrågan på högre genomströmning och låga latenser. Nya standarder som bygger på Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM), såsom Long Term Evolution (LTE) och Worldwide Interoperability för Microwave Access (WiMAX), har föreslagits och håller på att integreras I befintliga mobilnät över hela världen. LTE specifikationer håller på att färdigställas inom 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) med de ambitiösa målen om ökad spektral effektivitet och slutanvändare genomstr ömning. Trots införandet av flera tjänster av hög datahastighet, är röstkommunikation fortfarande en väsentlig del av den totala Wireless Wide Area cellulär kommunikation marknaden. I LTE är kärnnätet rent paketförmedlande därmed röst överförs helt och hållet med hjälp av en Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP). Precis som sina föregångare standarder är det önskvärt att ett stort antal samtidiga VoIP samtal få stöd i LTE, samtidigt som det uppfyller önskade Quality of Service (QoS) krav. Denna avhandling undersöker frågor relaterade till VoIP kapacitet för LTE. En av de viktigaste utmaningarna är det begränsade antalet schemaläggningsbart röst paket per sub ram. Det huvudsakliga målet med denna avhandling är att kvantifiera effekterna av denna begränsning. Efter att ha beskrivit de grundläggande LTE begrepp, är en detaljerad beskrivning av de resurser kontroll kanal begränsningar för schemaläggning av röst paket presenteras. Konsekvenser av dessa begränsningar förklaras systematiskt genom att presentera problemet i ett större sammanhang. Simulering resultat erhölls med hjälp av openWNS Simulator, en händelse driven systemnivå simulering som utvecklats vid Communication Networks Research Group (ComNets), RWTH Aachen University Tyskland. Resultat presenteras som visar effekterna av olika schemaläggning strategier för VoIP kapacitet. Dessa resultat illustrerar hur de begränsade kontroll kanalresurser, särskilt fysiskt Downlink (PDCCH) resurser, påverkar det totala antalet schemaläggningsbart VoIP användare ljud mediaströmmar

Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract

The obligation to keep promises is a commonly acknowledged moral duty. Yet not all promises – however solemnly vowed – are enforceable at law. Why are some promises legally binding and others not? Orthodox doctrinal categories provide only modest assistance in answering this persistent question. Conventional analysis, for example, has distinguished promises made in exchange for a return promise or performance from nonreciprocal promises. Indeed, common law bargain theory is classically simple: bargained-for promises are presumptively enforceable; nonreciprocal promises are presumptively unenforceable. But this disarmingly simple theory has never mirrored reality. Contract law has ventured far beyond such narrow limitations, embracing reliance and unjust enrichment as additional principles of promissory obligation. Thus, a promise may be enforceable to the extent that the promisee has incurred substantial costs, or conferred benefits, in reasonable reliance on the promise. Promissory estoppel under Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts is the primary enforcement mechanism when action in reliance follows the promise. If the change of position by the promisee precedes the promise, its nexus with the promise is more subtle. For example, a promise is enforceable when it follows a non-donative material benefit conferred by the promisee. Unjust enrichment principles are typically invoked to enforce such past consideration promises. Despite this expansion of liability, gratuitous promises of gifts or unilateral pledges to confer benefits remain legally unenforceable

Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach

Part I of this Article examines the role of liquidated damage provisions and penalties in the context of a general theory of efficient breach of contract. The proof problems inherent in fully recovering idiosyncratic values within the context of operationally practical damage sanctions may prevent the non-breaching party from recovering his subjective expectations if recovery is limited to legally determined remedies. The expected cost of establishing true losses under conventional damage measures will thus induce parties who face uncertain or nonprovable anticipated losses to negotiate stipulated damage agreements. The current penalty rule subjects these agreements to costly review, based not on the fairness of the process, but on whether the initial estimate sufficiently mirrors the anticipated provable loss. Part II examines the hypothesis that, absent evidence of process unfairness in bargaining, efficiency will be enhanced by the enforcement of an agreed allocation of risks embodied in a liquidated damage clause. We argue that agreed damage measures and in terrorem provisions represent, under many circumstances, the most efficient means by which parties can insure against the otherwise non-compensable consequences of breach. Our hypothesis is then also tested against a series of conditions in order to identify alternative legal principles that may provide less costly means of avoiding the harmful effects whose perception apparently prompted the current penalty rule

Measuring Sellers\u27 Damages: The Lost-Profits Puzzle

A buyer repudiates a fixed-price contract to purchase goods, and the seller sues for damages. How should a court measure the seller\u27s loss? The answer seems simple: The seller should be awarded damages sufficient to place it in the same economic position it would have enjoyed had the buyer performed the contract. But the seductive conceptual simplicity of the compensation principle disguises substantial practical problems in measuring seller\u27s damages. Contract law has traditionally minimized measurement difficulties by basing damages in most cases on the difference between the contract price and market value of the repudiated goods. The common law courts generally limited the seller to such market damages whenever the seller had a resale market for the contract goods. These courts assumed that combining this damage award with proceeds from a resale would give the seller the profits that performance would have earned it

Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract

The obligation to keep promises is a commonly acknowledged moral duty. Yet not all promises – however solemnly vowed – are enforceable at law. Why are some promises legally binding and others not? Orthodox doctrinal categories provide only modest assistance in answering this persistent question. Conventional analysis, for example, has distinguished promises made in exchange for a return promise or performance from nonreciprocal promises. Indeed, common law bargain theory is classically simple: bargained-for promises are presumptively enforceable; nonreciprocal promises are presumptively unenforceable. But this disarmingly simple theory has never mirrored reality. Contract law has ventured far beyond such narrow limitations, embracing reliance and unjust enrichment as additional principles of promissory obligation. Thus, a promise may be enforceable to the extent that the promisee has incurred substantial costs, or conferred benefits, in reasonable reliance on the promise. Promissory estoppel under Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts is the primary enforcement mechanism when action in reliance follows the promise. If the change of position by the promisee precedes the promise, its nexus with the promise is more subtle. For example, a promise is enforceable when it follows a non-donative material benefit conferred by the promisee. Unjust enrichment principles are typically invoked to enforce such past consideration promises. Despite this expansion of liability, gratuitous promises of gifts or unilateral pledges to confer benefits remain legally unenforceable